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I
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that existing techniques for resolving public-sec-
tor collective bargaining impasses such as mediationfactflnding, arbitra-
tion and strikes all have substantial weaknesses. After examining the
policyproblems inherent in each of these methods, the authors propose a
new model for resolution of impasses. Their proposed model combines
mediation, factfinding, strikes and public referendums to avoid the defi-
ciencies inherent in any one technique.
The growth of public-sector unionism in the past two decades has
been a significant feature of public employment.' As public employees
have sought and obtained rights to bargain at the federal, state, and
local levels,2 numerous issues have arisen in connection with the bar-
gaining process. While the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
which covers employees in the private sector3 provides a frequent anal-
ogy for public-sector legislation,4 differences between public and pri-
vate-sector employment prevent the NLRA from serving as a complete
model for public employment. One of the most important differences
t Assistant Professor, Department of Labor Studies, Pennsylvania State University. B.A.
Fort Lewis College, 1967; Ph.D., University of Colorado, 1972; J.D. University of Colorado, 1976.
t Staff Attorney, Rocky Mountain District Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Tex-
tile Workers, AFL-CIO. B.A. University of New Haven, 1972; J.D. University of Colorado, 1983.
1. For a study of union penetration in the public sector, see Burton, The Extent of Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 1-43 (B. Aaron, J. Grodin & J.
Stern eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING].
2. The development of protective legislation is reviewed in Schneider, Public-Sector Labor
Legislation-An Evolutionary Analysis, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING, supra note 1, at 191.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the NLRA]. Section 2 (2) ex-
cludes "any state or political subdivision thereof' from the definition of "employer." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976). The provision is construed in NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600
(1971).
4. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n. v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803
(1974) (state provision pertaining to scope of bargaining is patterned after federal law; federal
interpretations are persuasive precedents).
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involves the right to strike.5
Historically, common law has not afforded workers in the United
States an absolute right to withhold their services from their employer.
Such action may be subject to judicial restriction.6 The NLRA, how-
ever, expressly protects this right,7 and prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against private employees engaged in strike activity.8 In
contrast, the majority of public employees do not have a statutory right
to undertake economic sanctions as a means of resolving bargaining
impasses,9 and constitutional protections do not extend to legitimize
such conduct.'o
Various legislative schemes other than the strike method have
been adopted to resolve disputes arising out of public negotiations.
None of these procedures, however, has been universally accepted as a
satisfactory method of impasse resolution.11 In each instance, the per-
mitting of intervention by a third person not a party to the agreement
impedes the original parties' resolution of the labor contract.' 2 Fur-
ther, several jurisdictions have declared one common method of im-
5. Compare, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976) ("Nothing in this Act, except as specifically pro-
vided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitation or qualifications on that right") with IowA CODE
§ 20.12 (1977) ("It shall be unlawful for any public employee or any employee organization, di-
rectly or indirectly, to induce, instigate, encourage, authorize, ratify, or participate in a strike
against any public employer.").
6. International Union, UAW-AFL Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949), modfledon other grounds, Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). See generally Hanslowe &
Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1055
(1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
8. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
9. Schneider, supra note 2, at 203 n.32, concludes that eight states provide legislative pro-
tection for strikes (Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont and
Wisconsin). Effective in April, 1984, Ohio will provide bargaining rights for broad categories of
public workers. The statute also affords employees right to strike, with the exception of certain
designated groups. The text of the statute is reprinted in 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 4411
(August 15, 1983). Illinois, in addition, has adopted legislation effective in 1984 allowing public
employee bargaining. The legislation consists of two separate acts, one covering teachers and the
other covering general groups of public workers. Each act is to be administered by its particular
agency. With the exception of security personnel and workers in essential services, employees
have a right to strike. See 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1954 (Oct. 3, 1983).
10. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.C. Cir.), afd 404 U.S. 802
(1971).
11. For a review of impasse procedures on a state-by-state basis, see Morris, The Role of
Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System, I INDUS. REL. L.J. 427, 456-78 (1976).
12. In the private sector, negotiation impasses are rarely submitted to arbitration. Where the
procedure is utilized, "it functions within fairly narrow parameters." Grodin, PoliticalAspects of
Public Sector InterestArbitration, I INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1976). Thus, the preferred method of
private-sector bargaining is based on consent rather than on the mandate of a disinterested
individual.
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passe resolution unconstitutional as a matter of state law.1
3
The strike model utilized in private-sector bargaining has the pri-
mary advantage of imposing significant hardship on recalcitrant par-
ties. A strike is an undertaking of such magnitude that it is rarely
employed as a means of settling disputes in negotiations; the threat of a
strike itself is usually an adequate incentive to settle differences.'
4
Common methods of public-sector impasse resolution are, in contrast,
relatively inexpensive and readily available.'" Both features detract
substantially from the effectiveness of the methods.' 6
This article proposes a new procedure for dispute resolution. The
suggested procedure combines legislative approaches currently in ef-
fect, including the strike option, with a novel alternative used by sev-
eral municipalities in Colorado: the submission of impasses to a vote
of the electorate. Such a submission was successfully utilized to resolve
an impasse in negotiations between Denver and the International Asso-
ciation of Firefighters, Local 858. The proposed procedure will en-
courage realistic, meaningful bargaining and will avoid the lack of
political accountability inherent in other impasse-resolution
techniques.
To provide a framework for the proposed "Referendum Model,"
this article first describes current methods of dispute resolution. It then
discusses a critical distinction between public-sector and private-sector
collective bargaining, the inherently political nature of public negotia-
tions, and explores this distinction in the context of both judicial deci-
sions and theory. Next, the feasibility of dispute resolution by public
election is demonstrated through an examination of the Denver and
Local 858 experience. Finally, a legislative model is proposed, incorpo-
rating third-party intervention, strikes, and elections.
13. Eg., Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790
(1976) (invalidating a provision of a city charter providing for final and binding arbitration as a
means of impasse resolution, on the basis that the ordinance results in an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power). The case is discussed infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
14. One measurement of strike activity is the loss of working time. According to one author-
ity, "The total working time lost due to strikes.., continues to range well below one half of one
percent; the range in recent years has been between 0.14 and 0.37 percent." T. KOCHAN, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 249 (1980).
15. See generally, Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 64 (1979).
16. Without the threatened hardship of the strike, neither party will have much incen-
tive to give anything away in negotiations. And if one assumes that the arbitrator will
split the difference between opposing positions, the process will reward the obdurate,
rather than those who modify their positions during negotiations. Thus, while compul-
sory arbitration can settle disputes, it can also undermine and supplant the bargaining
process.
Feigenbaum, Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than Practice, 14 INDUS. REL. 311, 312
(1975).
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II
IMPASSE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES AND ATTENDANT
PROBLEMS
A. Third-Party Intervention
The most common forms of dispute resolution involving interven-
tion by a party outside the bargaining process are mediation, factfind-
ing, and arbitration. Each method has its distinctive features and
particular disadvantages.
1. Mediation
Mediation is based upon the theory that the injection of a neutral,
but knowledgeable, third party into the negotiation process will assist
the employer and the union in reaching a voluntary settlement.'7 The
mediator, who may be either a private citizen or a professional govern-
ment employee,' 8 performs a variety of functions designed to facilitate
a harmonious resolution of the dispute. Those functions have been cat-
egorized as procedural, communicative, and substantive.' 9 The proce-
dural function includes activities such as scheduling and conducting
meetings, developing agendas, and arranging deadlines.2" The com-
municative function involves maintaining a flow of information be-
tween parties who are unable or unwilling to exchange information
directly.
It is the substantive function which lies at the heart of mediation.
Acting as a catalyst, the mediator encourages settlement through strate-
gies such as discerning priorities, offering specific proposals for consid-
eration, realistically evaluating respective positions, and helping to
formulate bargaining "packages."'" The end result is the parties' at-
tainment of mutually beneficial understandings which would have
been unattainable without the mediator's assistance.
Mediation is the most frequently used method of dispute resolu-
tion.22 It is most effective when an impasse derives from procedural
rather than substantive elements of bargaining.23 Among the variables
17. See Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR
BARGAINING, supra note i, at 177-182.
18. For example, Congress created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS),
an independent federal agency, under Title II of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1976). Through mediation, the agency aids in preventing and minimizing labor disputes
affecting commerce, and will provide the services of a mediator to parties upon request. State
agencies may offer similar services. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Purdon 1977-78).
19. W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 77 (1971).
20. See id. at 77-94.
21. Id at 98-106.
22. T. KOCHAN, supra note 14, at 272.
23. Id at 283-84.
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conductive to successful mediation are inexperienced negotiators,
overcommitment to a given position, few sources of impasse, parties
motivated to reach settlement, and an aggressive, experienced media-
tor.24 Conversely, mediation is least effective where impasse results
from an employer's inability to pay, where the parties habitually rely
on the impasse procedure, and where impasse occurs in large
jurisdictions.25
2. Facoinding
Factfinding is predicated on the utility of rational persuasion
rather than the exercise of power. It shares formal characteristics with
both mediation and arbitration.
A factfinder or factfinding panel gathers information through a
hearing process. Parties to the hearing introduce evidence and argue
the merits of their respective proposals. The factfinder subsequently
issues an advisory award. Each impasse is tentatively resolved and
supported by an appropriate rationale. Theoretically, the award is suf-
ficiently fair and reasonable to form the basis for voluntary settlement.
The assumption of the factfinding process is that once an award is
put before the parties and the public, it will be clothed with sufficient
authority to force the parties to acquiesce in its conclusions. The public
will regard the award as a just settlement and bring pressure on the
parties to accept it. But as one commentator observes,
Every study of factfinding in the public sector has concluded. that it
has not had this result. In most cases the interest and concern of the
public is not aroused sufficiently to activate the pressure needed to pro-
duce a settlement. Public interest is apparently aroused only when a
strike threatens or actually imposes direct hardship.26
Moreover, the effectiveness of factfinding has declined over time in re-
gard to several important objectives, including the ability to avoid
strikes, to induce settlements, and to attain increased acceptability. 27
Nevertheless, factfinding remains a popular component of dispute
resolution. It may be used in conjunction with mediation or as a prel-
ude to arbitration.28 When an impasse poses a significant risk to the
parties, such as a strike, factfinding can become a viable intermediate
stage in the resolution process.
24. T. Kochan, Dunamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BAR-
GAINING, supra note 1, at 179.
25. Id
26. T. KOCHAN, supra note 14, at 293.
27. Id
28. The experience in New York State indicates that fact-finding, as a preliminary to arbitra-
tion, may result in substantial duplication of effort. Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution, in
PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING, supra note 1, at 183-85.
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3. Arbitration
The most formalized of dispute-resolution procedures, arbitration
conclusively determines all impasses subject only to limited judicial re-
view.29 As a result of its conclusive nature, arbitration achieves the
highest level of avoidance of strikes.3"
As with factfinding, arbitration operates by means of a hearing
before an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. Evidence and argument
are presented, after which the arbitrator makes a final and binding dis-
position of each impasse. A popular modification known as "final-of-
fer" arbitration limits the arbitrator to a choice of one of the final
negotiating packages of the parties.3
The arbitrator's role in dispute resolution is to formulate an agree-
ment which approximates as nearly as possible the settlement which
the parties themselves would have reached. As one eminent arbitrator
explained:
Arbitration of contract terms differs radically from arbitration of griev-
ances. The latter calls for a judicial determination of existing contract
rights; the former calls for a determination, upon considerations of pol-
icy, fairness, and expediency, of what the contract rights ought to be.
In submitting this case to arbitration, the parties have merely extended
their negotiations--they have left it to this board to determine what
they should, by negotiations, have agreed upon. We take it that the
fundamental issue is: What should the parties themselves, as reason-
able men, have voluntarily agreed to?3 2
In order to arrive at reasonable settlements, arbitrators rely on
standards developed through prior adjudications. Those standards, as
one authority points out, "are not pulled out of the air-nor are they
artificially created. They are, generally speaking, the very same ones
that are used by the parties in their negotiations."33 Such standards
include prevailing practices within an industry or area, the nature of
the work under consideration, the employer's ability to pay, productiv-
ity, and general economic conditions.34 In some instances, standards
are provided by the enabling legislation.35
29. The extent to which a court will examine the merits of an interest arbitration award is
discussed in Grodin, Judicial Response to Public-Sector Arbitration, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAIN-
ING, supra note 1, at 224, 248-253. See also Morris, supra note 11, at 492-94; Caso v. Coffey, 41
N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683 (1976).
30. T. KOCLIAN, supra note 14, at 295.
31. Final-offer arbitration is based upon the assumption that it will encourage realistic bar-
gaining and limit the discretion of the arbitrator. For a detailed study of the systems in Penn-
sylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, see J. STERN, FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THE EFFECTS ON
PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE BARGAINING (1975).
32. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. & Dispute Res. 845, 858 (McCoy, 1947).
33. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 745 (3d ed. 1972).
34. See id at 749-96.
35. Eg., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 423.239 (1976).
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As a means of resolving disputes, arbitration is typically viewed as
the most effective substitute for public-sector work stoppages. There is
substantial empirical evidence to support the conclusion that far fewer
strikes occur where arbitration is mandated.36 In addition, arbitration
may serve to redress inequalities in bargaining power and to provide
social and political stability.37 This feature, however, is antithetical to
the established concept under the NLRA that bargaining outcomes are
determined by the economic strength of the parties. 38
One frequent criticism of arbitration is that it tends to inhibit gen-
uine bargaining. 39 Rather than engage in realistic negotiations, parties
select the less painful alternative of arbitration. According to Feuille,
Arbitration will be invoked because one or both sides believe that an
arbitration award may be more favorable than a negotiated agreement
and because one or both believe the costs of using arbitration are com-
paratively low (none of the trauma and costs of a work stoppage and
none of the uncertainty of using other forms of political influence). As
a result of this cost-benefit calculus, the availability of arbitration may
have a "chilling effect" upon the parties' efforts to negotiate an agree-
ment, and over time there may be a "narcotic effect" as the aprties be-
come arbitration addicts who habitually rely on arbitrators to write
their labor contracts.40
A more fundamental attack on arbitration derives from the struc-
ture of our democratic society. The perceived weakness of interest ar-
bitration is that it is "inimical to a basic precept of political democracy,
namely that authoritative political decisions should be reached by gov-
ernmental officials who are accountable to the public. Arbitrators are
not accountable to the public."'4' This lack of political accountability
has led some courts to reject arbitration, finding it to be an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power.42
B. Constitutional Analysis and Policy Issues
The majority of courts have upheld statutes that provide for bind-
ing interest arbitration for public employees. 43 Nevertheless, such stat-
36. Feuille, supra note 15, at 65.
37. Id at 68-71.
38. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
39. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 16, at 312.
40. Feuille, supra note 15, at 73.
41. Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators and the Public Interest, 28 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 497,
499 (1975).
42. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 191 Colo. 419 553 P.2d 790 (1976);
Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977); Sioux Falls v.
Sioux Falls Firefighters, 89 S.D. 455, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975); Town of Berlin v. Santaquida, 98
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3289 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
43. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116
Cal. Rptr. 507, (1974); Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Arlington
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utes have been attacked on various constitutional grounds, including
the violation of the fourteenth amendment.44 The most compelling ar-
gument, however, challenges these statutes as unconstitutional delega-
tions of legislative authority. This argument is significant for purposes
of this article because it focuses attention on the relations between the
arbitrator and the processes of public decision-making.
Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley45 illustrates the mi-
nority position. In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated
a city charter amendment that provided for binding arbitration of un-
resolved police union disputes. The court held that delegation of legis-
lative power to politically unaccountable persons is unconstitutional.
The court observed that certain basic principles of representative gov-
ernment cannot be contravened:
Fundamental among them is the precept that officials engaged in gov-
ernmental decision-making (e.g., setting budgets, salaries, and other
terms and conditions of public employment) must be accountable to the
citizens they represent. Binding arbitration removes these decisions
from the aegis of elected representatives, placing them in the hands of
an outside person who has no accountability to the public.'
The court's chief concern was to preserve the process mandated by the
state's constitution, which provided that "[elvery person having author-
ity to exercise or exercising any public or governmental duty, power or
function, shall be an elective officer, or one appointed, drawn or desig-
nated in accordance with law by an elective officer or officers."' 47 The
court found that binding arbitration would unacceptably attenuate the
link between the electorate and the decision-makers.48
In another case typical of this trend, the Utah Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion regarding binding interest arbitration for
v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); Richfield v. Local
No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979); Medford Fire Fighters Ass'n
v. Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979); Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's
Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553
P.2d 1316 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975) (equal protection
attack rejected); Buffalo v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd., 80 Misc.2d 741,
363 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1975) (due process attack rejected); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560
(1969).
45. 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976).
46. ld at 422, 553 P.2d at 793.
47. COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 4.
48. In City of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858, AFL-CIO, No. 81SC70, slip op.
(Colo. May 9, 1983), the Colorado Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that Greeley Police Union
stands for the proposition that "the ultimate responsibility for the establishment of... terms and
conditions of public employment ... are legislative matters, and the ultimate responsibility for
the establishment of such terms must rest with elected officials."
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firefighters.4 9 According to the Utah court,
The power conferred on the panel of arbitrators is not consonant with
the concept of representative democracy. The political power, which
the people possess under Article I, Sec. 2, and which they confer on
their elected representatives is to be exercised by persons responsible
and accountable to the people-not independent of them. The act is
designed to insulate the decision-making process and the results from
accountability within the political process; therefore, it is not an appro-
priate means of resolving legislative-political issues.
5 °
Once again, the perceived threat to the representative government
motivates the court to invalidate the binding arbitration provisions.5 '
Conversely, a majority of courts have held that lack of political
accountability does not ipsofacto invalidate binding interest arbitration
statutes. For example, in Milwaukee County v. District Council 48,52 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that
mandated the appointment of a mediator-arbitrator by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC) after a reasonable period
of negotiation, if settlement procedures fail to break a deadlock.5 3
Under the statute, parties to the deadlock submit their final offers to the
mediator-arbitrator, who arranges a public meeting if so petitioned by
at least five citizens. This meeting allows the parties to explain and
justify their positions, and affords the public the opportunity to offer
comments and suggestions. Following this, the mediator-arbitrator at-
tempts to mediate the dispute for a reasonable time; if unsuccessful, the
mediator-arbitrator notifies the parties that the dispute will be resolved
through binding arbitration. If both parties then withdraw their final
offers, the labor organization may strike. Otherwise, binding arbitra-
tion would apply.
In finding the statute constitutional, the court outlined three re-
quirements for a valid delegation of legislative authority. First, the
legislative purpose of the statute must be ascertainable. Second, spe-
cific standards must limit the exercise of the arbitrator's statutory
power. And third, judicial and procedural safeguards must exist to en-
sure that the legislative purpose is satisfied.
The Wisconsin court conceded that the statutory system does not
provide for the mediator-arbitrator's direct accountability to the electo-
rate. It concluded, however, it must defer to the legislature:
49. Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654 and 2064,
563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
50. Id at 790.
51. See also Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 89 S.D. 455, 234 N.W.2d 35
(1975); Town of Berlin v. Santaquida, 98 L.R.R.M (BNA) 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
52. 102 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (1982).
53. Id. at 20-29, 325 N.W.2d at 354-58.
490 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:481
In this case the legislature struggled with the difficult problem of arriv-
ing at a fair dispute resolution system for both the public employer and
the public employees. It determined that the unilateral determination
of employment matters by the employer gave little weight to the rights
of employees. It also determined that the right to strike, a traditional
employee right, posed too great a threat to the smooth operation of
essential public services. It was in this context that the legislature de-
vised a system for binding arbitration through an impartial arbitrator.
The underlying premise of public employer-employee arbitration
is that communities will forego the consequences of embittered eco-
nomic warfare if there is a process to resolve disputes under fair and
neutral principles. Consequently, the legislature must be allowed some
flexibility in formulating a procedure to resolve the conflict between
direct electoral accountability and the independence afforded through
insulation from the political process.54
Thus, the court recognizes that some degree of political accountability
may need to be sacrificed in order to attain the legislative ends sought.
That determination is arrived at by legislative balancing.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In City of Detroit v.
Detroit Police Officers," the Michigan Supreme Court found that an
amended statute which provided for binding interest arbitration was
constitutional despite limited accountability of the decision-maker. Af-
ter an extended discussion of the problems of accountability, the court
suggested that the elected officials who devised the scheme provided a
sufficient link between the electorate and the decision-maker. In the
court's view: "Should the people be dissatisfied with the accountability
aspect of the engineered scheme which must necessarily transcend local
boundaries, the onus is upon the state's electorate, including the locally
affected voting population, to exercise its political will."56 The ac-
countability of the elected officials thus adequately safeguards repre-
sentative democracy. Although it recognizes that particular decisions
by individual arbitrators remain insulated from the political process,
the Michigan court's view minimizes the political consequences of that
fact.57 Further, it tends to obscure the substantial policy issues implicit
in the matter of accountability.
Dissenting in Detroit Police Officers, Judge Levin forcefully delin-
eates the theoretical basis of the delegation doctrine. Judge Levin
54. Id at 30-31, 325 N.W.2d at 357-58.
55. 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.w.2d 68 (1980).
56. Id at 477, 294 N.w.2d at 94.
57. The opinion suggests that such insulation may actually be a virtue. It quotes approv-
ingly from Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979),
to the effect that the legislature may have deliberately isolated the arbitrators from public pressure
to protect their decisions from undue influence. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408
Mich. 410, 473 n.55, 294 N.W.2d 68, 91 n.55 (1980).
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states that the policy matter at stake is not simply the degree of control
imposed on the decision-maker, but rather the integrity of the mecha-
nism through which power is apportioned. He writes,
A court reviewing a challenged delegation of legislative power should,
we agree, examine whether adequate checks have been provided
against arbitrary or uncontrolled official action. Such an inquiry can-
not, however, supplant the basic inquiry whether the legislatively de-
vised framework for official action-considered in its application-
secures the fundamental goal of the delegation doctrine: preserving
legislative responsibility for the determination of public policy.
5 8
Thus, Judge Levin finds that accountability is a necessary element of
any delegation, serving not so much to correct occasional aberrational
rulings as to ensure that the legislature and the electorate maintain con-
trol over the formulation of coherent policies. Regarding the statute
under consideration, Judge Levin concludes that "Act 312 arbitration is
novel in that the policy-making power is dispersed among ad hoc arbi-
trators, which prevents the emergence of visible and intelligible
principles."59
In the earlier case of Dearborn Fire Fighters,6 ° Judge Levin re-
jected the contention that accountability could be sacrificed in order to
attain finality and efficiency in dispute resolution. He asserted that
maintenance of governmental processes should be the focal point of
judicial inquiry and that no substantial diminution of electoral power
should be tolerated. He concluded,
While delegation of authority to resolve the dispute to an independent
outsider may resolve the immediate crisis and relieves the public em-
ployer and union officials of the need to justify the result, this approach
to legislative decision-making, precisely because it is designed to insu-
late the decision-making process and the results from accountability
within the political process, is not consonant with proper governance
and is not an appropriate method for resolving legislative-political is-
sues in a representative democracy.6 1
Although Judge Levin's view reflects the minority judical trend, it ad-
umbrates concerns which are central to the theoretical framework of
public negotiations and which must be addressed in a system of dispute
resolution.
Binding interest arbitration necessarily invokes questions concern-
ing democratic values. Even though a majority of jurisdictions have
upheld binding arbitration, judicial opinions have shown considerable
58. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. at 520, 294 N.W.2d at 113 (Levin J., dissenting).
59. Id at 522, 294 N.W.2d at 114.
60. 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
61. Id at 258, 231 N.W.2d at 236.
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sensitivity to the proper functioning of the political process. 62 In a sys-
tem of dispute resolution that compromises the framework of demo-
cratic decision-making, the problem of inadequate accountability will
remain intractable for both legislatures and courts. Similar problems
may also arise in the resolution of disputes through strikes.
C Public Strikes and the Public Interest
1. Theoretical Considerations
One of the most significant distinctions between private and public
sector bargaining systems is the use of strikes as a means of impasse
resolution. In the private sector, employees may freely apply economic
sanctions against the employer in order to extract concessions.63 A
weak employer will be forced to grant the concessions. On the other
hand, a strong employer may permanently replace the striking employ-
ees,' thereby forcing employees who desire to keep their jobs to accept
the employer's terms. Regardless of the outcome, the terms and condi-
tions of the contract are reached on a strictly voluntary basis.
In the public sector, employee and employer interests are not
sharply delineated in an economic context. Public employers are pri-
marily responsible for the delivery of services which are often not read-
ily obtainable outside the public sector, as in the case of police and fire
protection. These services are evaluated in terms of intangibles such as
quality of service and public image rather than on profit-generation.
As a "servant" of the public, the public employee is held to a different
standard of conduct than that applied to the private sector worker.
Consequently, in work stoppages, the economic consequences to both
the public employer and employee may be secondary to the political
consequences involved.
The topic of public sector work stoppages has generated a substan-
tial body of commentary exploring the relationship between strike ac-
tivity and the political process. The commentary is inconclusive on the
issue of whether public employees should be allowed to strike. Never-
theless, academic discussion has illuminated one major difference be-
tween private and public bargaining: the political implications of
public negotiations and impasse resolution.
In the influential The Unions and the Cities,65 Professors Welling-
ton and Winter propose the thesis that public sector strikes distort the
62. For a discussion of some of the political concerns which may arise from the arbitration
process, see Grodin, supra note 12.
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
64. Id at 345.
65. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).
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normal political process by focusing disproportionate pressure on pub-
lic officials. The Wellington-Winter argument holds that
because strikes in public employment disrupt important services, a
large part of a mayor's political constituency will, in many cases, press
for a quick end to the strike with little concern for the cost of settle-
ment. This is particularly so where the cost of settlement is borne by a
different and larger political constituency, the citizens of the state or
nation. Since interest groups other than public employees, with con-
flicting claims on municipal government, do not, as a general proposi-
tion, have anything approaching the effectiveness of the strike-or at
least cannot maintain that relative degree of power over the long run-
they may be put at a significant competitive disadvantage in the polit-
ical process.
66
Thus, the argument continues, public sector unions do not suffer the
same constraints as their private sector counterparts, in that the public
strike will be promptly settled with no significant economic sanctions
against the union membership. The strike weapon in public employ-
ment, therefore, is qualitatively distinct from its function in the private
sector.
The Wellington-Winter theory has been challenged on a number
of grounds. An empirical study by Professors Burton and Krider6 7 sug-
gests that effective market restraints on public employees do exist, such
as the loss of wages, the threat of replacement, and public concern over
possible tax increases. Moreover, it is clear that not all governmental
services are unavailable outside of the public sector. Sanitation serv-
ices, for example, are frequently provided by private contractors. A
further argument in favor of economic resolution of impasses is that
forcing labor unions to rely on traditional political strategies such as
lobbying can distort the political process by leading to corruption and
patronage. Accordingly, Burton and Krider conclude that
[o]ur field work suggests that unions which have actually helped their
members either have made the strike threat a viable weapon despite its
illegality or have intertwined patronage-political support arrangements.
If this assessment is correct, choice of the No-Strike Model is likely to
lead to patterns of decision making which will subvert, if not the "nor-
mal" American political process, at least the political process which the
Taylor Committee and Wellington and Winter meant to embrace. We
would not argue that the misuse of political power will be eliminated
by legalizing the strike; on balance, however, we believe that, in regard
to most governmental functions, the Strike Model has more virtues
66. Id at 25. See also, Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
67. Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE
L.J. 418 (1970).
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than the No-Strike Model.68
The above discussion suggests two propositions essential to a theo-
retical analysis of public sector strikes. First, the inherent nature of
public employment requires that focus be placed on the political conse-
quences of strikes.6 9 Second, no conclusive argument has been offered
which would justify prohibiting all public sector strikes under all cir-
cumstances. Indeed, justifications advanced in the past were, in many
instances, dogmatic assertions aimed at preventing any form of public
collective bargaining. As one scholar notes,
[t]he predominant view during the first half of the century was that
strikes were a form of organized anarchy and, therefore, represented a
direct assault on the sovereignty of government. Since strikes were
viewed as a necessary component of any collective bargaining system, it
followed that the collective bargaining process was inappropriate for
public employees. 0
In contrast, contemporary scholarship tends to regard strikes as a
viable option among the mechanisms for public sector dispute resolu-
tion.7 ' In one recent study, for example, the author concludes that "the
impact of strikes in the public sector has not been sufficiently detrimen-
tal to the interests of the public to justify the current presumption
against their legality.' ' 72 He continues,
[B]oth labor and management would benefit from the right to strike
because it yields the bilateral determination of terms and conditions of
employment. The importance of this outcome cannot be understated.
Despite the high costs of strikes relative to the direct costs of hiring an
arbitrator to resolve interest disputes, few parties in the private sector
voluntarily agree to substitute interest arbitration for the right to strike,
which indicates that the parties derive tremendous benefit from being
able to determine their own future free from the unpredictable deci-
sions of an arbitrator. Assuming that labor and management in the
public sector have similar preferences, each side would benefit from the
right to strike because the outcome under a strike threat is a bilateral
settlement that reflects the preferences and bargaining power of the
68. Id at 432.
69. Burton and Krider point out that "any scheme which differentiates economic power
from political power faces a perplexing definitional task." Id. at 429. That assertion may have
some degree of validity insofar as it pertains to the exertion of pressure by a labor organization.
Nevertheless, a functional distinction can be drawn between the individual as a consumer of
goods and services and as a citizen of the municipality. As demonstrated by the case study dis-
cussed, citizens may in fact place civic concerns above their own economic self-interest. See infra
notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
70. Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAIN-
ING, supra note 1, at 151.
71. See id. at 157-69.
72. Olson, The Use of the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, in INDUS. REL. RE-
SEARCH Assoc., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1982 SPRING MEETING 494, 500 (B. Dennis ed. 1982).
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parties.73
The desirability of voluntary agreement as the product of negotiation
has also been emphasized by other authorities in the field.74
In sum, public sector strikes involve a political component which
distinguishes public sector bargaining from the private sector. The ar-
guments advanced both by Wellington and Winter and by Burton and
Krider clarify the relationship between public employee strike activity
and the political system. Certainly every public sector strike does not
result in immediate capitulation by the public employer, even when the
strike involves an important service such as mass transportation. 75 At
the same time, an impasse-resolution mechanism ideally should ac-
comodate the potentially disproportionate application of political
power described by Wellington and Winter. Some states have chosen
to allow designated public employees to strike.76 The strike model
adopted by Pennsylvania is considered as a viable example of the
means by which public sector strikes can be authorized and regulated.
2. A Legislative Experiment
In 1970, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted the Public
Employee Relations Act (Act 195) 77 which permits strikes by certain
groups of public sector workers. The amendment illustrates a reasoned
and balanced treatment of employee, employer, and public interests.
Moreover, a number of public sector strikes have proven that the sys-
tem is workable.78
Impasse resolution under Act 195 is based upon a series of
mandatory steps, followed by several voluntary options. The statute
also incorporates explicit safeguards to prevent undue danger to the
public welfare.79
The first step in impasse resolution is mediation, which the parties
must invoke if an agreement has not been reached within a specified
73. Id at 501 (emphasis in original).
74. See, e.g., Clark, A Discussion in INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc., PROCEEDINGS OF THE
1982 SPRING MEETING 508 (B. Dennis ed. 1982) "[I1f I were faced with the task of selecting one of
[the] alternatives, I would unequivocally favor granting all non-essential public employees the
right to strike in lieu of mandating compulsory arbitration as the terminal step of the bargaining
process."
75. See Hogler, The Regional Transportation District Strike and the Colorado Labor Peace
Act: A Study in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 203 (1983).
76. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
78. For an analysis of the statute and its operation, see Decker, The Right to Strikefor Penn-
sylvania's Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramificationsfor the Public Employer, 17 DuQ.
L. REV. 755 (1978-79).
79. Any strike may be enjoined if it threatens the public health, safety or welfare. See infra
text accompanying notes 94-101.
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period.8" Mediation is initiated by written notice to the Pennsylvania
Bureau of Mediation.a Once commenced, mediation continues as long
as the parties are in disagreement. After twenty days,82 however, the
Bureau of Mediation is required to notify the Pennsylvania Labor Re-
lations Board 3 of the impasse. The Board may thereupon, in its dis-
cretion, appoint a factfinding panel empowered to conduct hearings
and issue subpoenas.8 4
If the parties have not reached agreement during the factfinding
process, the factflinding panel will make recommendations for resolu-
tion of the impasse. The parties must accept or reject the recommenda-
tions within ten days, and must promptly notify the board and each
other of their choice.85 If the panel's recommendations are rejected, the
panel "shall publicize its findings of fact and recommendations."86 The
parties are then given an additional ten-day period to reconsider the
recommendations.87 The failure of a party to submit to mediation or
factfnding procedures "shall be deemed a refusal to bargain in good
faith," and is grounds for issuance of an unfair-practice complaint.
88
Nothing in the mandatory procedures precludes an agreement to sub-
mit the impasse to voluntary binding arbitration. 89
Following exhaustion of the mandatory procedures,9" disputes are
governed by the strike clause. While generally permitting strikes, it
prohibits strikes by guards at prisons or mental hospitals or by employ-
ees "directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the
courts," and prescribes appropriate actions in the event of such
strikes.9' Police and fire personnel, not specifically covered by Act 195,
are granted collective bargaining rights by a separate statute.92 These
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). Impasse procedures are trig-
gered by the "budget submission date." Mediation must commence if an agreement has not been
reached 150 days prior to that date.
81. Id
82. Id at § 1101.802.
83. The Board is an administrative body legislatively authorized to implement Act 195 with
the power to issue rules and regulations. Id §§ 1101.501-1101.503.
84. Id § 1101.802.
85. Id § 1101.802(2).
86. Id § 1101.802(2).
87. Id § 1101.803(3).
88. Id § 1101.803.
89. Id § 1101.804.
90. Exhaustion is a necessary condition to a legally protected strike. If the condition is not
satisfied, sanctions may be imposed against the labor organization and striking employees. United
Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 22 Pa. Commw. 25, 347 A.2d 509
(1975).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The public employer is
required to initiate an action "for appropriate equitable relief including but not limited to
injunctions."
92. Id §§ 217.1-217.10.
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workers are afforded a right to arbitrate bargaining impasses.93
Provided that it is not explicitly prohibited and that mediation and
factflnding have taken place, a strike "shall not be prohibited unless or
until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public."94 A public employer who be-
lieves that this level has been reached may initiate an action for appro-
priate relief in the jurisdiction's court of common pleas.95 An
injunction, however, will not issue simply because routine procedures
have been disrupted96 or because services cannot be furnished by the
employer.97  Furthermore, the strike must actually be in progress
before an injunction will be issued. 98 The court typically will consider
a number of factors in determining the merits of the action, including
the population percentage affected by the strike, the strike's interfer-
ence with other statutorily mandated objectives, nonstriker loss of
wages, and potential and actual violence. 99 If the strike is enjoined, the
public employee's or the labor organization's refusal to comply with
the injunction may result in a variety of sanctions for contempt. The
employee may be subject to discharge, a fine, or imprisonment,"° and
the organization may be fined for each day it is in contempt. 1 '
In general, Act 195 serves to accomodate the several interests that
are affected by public negotiations. The Pennsylvania experience dem-
onstrates that public sector strikes within the scope of municipal gov-
ernance can be adequately regulated and can function effectively to
resolve bargaining impasses. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority
of states that permit public bargaining have rejected the strike as a
means of impasse resolution.0 2 To the legislators in such states public-
employee work stoppages are simply unacceptable. Accordingly, the
strike weapon in public negotiations must be appropriately circum-
scribed in order to attain any significant measure of support.
D. Evaluation and Summary
As the foregoing analysis indicates, public-sector dispute resolu-
tion techniques exhibit certain obvious shortcomings. While some pro-
93. Id § 1101.805.
94. Id § 1101.1003.
95. Id
96. See, e.g., Armstrong Educ. Ass'n. v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291
A.2d 120 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Highland Sewer and Water Auth. v. Local Union 459, 676 Pa.D. & C.2d 564
(1973) (strike by municipal water and sewage treatment employees).
98. See Commonwealth v. Ryan, 459 Pa. 148, 327 A.2d 351 (1974).
99. Decker, supra note 78, at 766-67, and cases cited.
100. PA. STAT ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1007 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
101. Id at§ I101.1008.
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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cedures may perform more effectively in particular respects than do
others, no single system has been widely adopted in bargaining legisla-
tion. Ideally, a resolution mechanism should avoid undue disruption
of and interference with necessary community services. It should also
protect against any "chilling" or "narcotic" effects. 10 3 Finally, the
mechanism should move parties toward realistic bargaining and volun-
tary settlements.
Mediation to a certain degree satisfies the final criterion, assisting
the parties to reach a voluntary settlement. Also, because mediation is
not binding, chilling and narcotic effects are minimal. Mediation, how-
ever, has not proved to be a workable substitute for the strike
weapon. 1' Further, mediation is most frequently successful in those
situations where the parties are not in disagreement regarding substan-
tive contract issues.10
5
Like mediation, factfinding does not impose a binding decision on
the parties, and therefore is not significant in preventing strikes. It may
tend, however, to persuade parties of the essentail correctness of a
given recommendation. Factfinding appears to have declined in popu-
larity, thus indicating its undesirable quality as an impasse-resolution
mechanism. to6
Arbitration has a better record of avoiding strikes than do other
resolution procedures.'t 7 Yet the features of arbitration which so effec-
tively remove the strike incentive-availability, relative low cost, and
finality-make arbitration an attractive diversion from genuine bar-
gaining over difficult issues. There is a discernible tendency for arbi-
tration to chill bargaining and to induce a soporific bargaining
environment. 0 8 Consequently, arbitration does little to motivate par-
ties to reach a voluntary settlement; in fact, it severely detracts from
that dimension of the bargaining process. Although final-offer arbitra-
tion may minimize these attributes, it does not remove them.0 9
103. T. KOCHAN, supra note 14, at 291-92, Kochan advances five criteria for the evaluation of
dispute resolution procedures, including the avoidance of strikes. Id. The procedure proposed
here would permit strikes which do not involve substantial harm to the community.
104. In one study, for example, the author contends that a mediator's effectiveness derives in
significant part from the mediator's ability to "bluff" the parties into a belief that their adversaries
are desirous of a strike. Byrnes, Mediator-Generated Pressure Tactics, 7 J. OF COLLECTIVE NEGO-
TIATIONS IN THE PUB. SECTOR 103 (1978).
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. "Although the majority of states that have enacted bargaining legislation still have fact-
finding as an important part of their impasse procedures for nonuniformed services, the bulk of
the evidence suggests that its effectiveness, both in avoiding strikes and in achieving settlements,
has atrophied over time." Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, in PuB-
LIC-SECTOR BARGAINING, supra note 1, at 183.
107. T. KOCHAN, supra note 14, at 295.
108. See supra text accompanying note 40.
109. Another approach which has some popularity is to limit the arbitrator to the full
endorsement of either party's last offer. Although this would appear to stimulate the
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Arbitration is also unacceptable in terms of legal and political the-
ory: its delegation of legislative authority may be constitutionally inva-
lid. Even if this hurdle is overcome, arbitration nevertheless removes
important decisional processes from the direct control of the electo-
rate. t° That consequence is in important respects incompatible with
the notion of a pluralistic democracy.1 1
The option of sanctioning public sector strikes as a means of dis-
pute resolution has been utilized in a minority of jurisdictions and has
attracted increasing support from commentators.' 12 As in the private
sector, the strike threat constitutes the most viable incentive to bargain-
ing. 1 3 Practical experience in one state, at least, suggests that the strike
option is feasible.
It must be recognized that public employment differs significantly
from private-sector employment. Most importantly, determinations as
to the appropriate terms and conditions of employment are ultimately
made by the electorate. Those determinations, involving such in-
tangibles as the quality of community life, differentiate the individual
as a participant in the democratic process from the individual as a con-
sumer of goods or services. Consequently, work stoppages by public
employees evoke a response more complex than the economic self-in-
terest which dominates individuals affected by a private sector strike.
Accordingly, public sector impasse resolution procedures should ac-
commodate the political implications of strikes as well as their eco-
nomic impact. The model proposed in the next section does so.
parties to set forth their true final demands, it need not in fact elicit such honesty. Each
side is bound to frame its last offer in the light of what it believes will be forthcoming
from the other side. And indeed, the 'last offers' from both might be little different from
their initial positions, placing the arbitrator in an untenable position if he wishes to issue
an award which is most likely to provide the greatest assurance of the parties continuing
in a good ongoing relationship. Additionally, the number of issues which traditionally
constitute an impasse make a simple choice of one side's last offer by the arbitrator not
only weighty but, more importantly, conducive to destruction rather than improvement
in the parties' relationship. Such an approach might more easily work if the choice were
between positions presented on one issue, but too few impasses are so simple.
Zack, Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 120 (S.
Zagoria ed. 1972).
110. See cases cited supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying note 41.
112. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
113. "While strikes occur in only about two to three percent of all private sector negotiations,
many of the remaining peacefully negotiated contracts would not be reached in a timely fashion if
it were not for the threat of a strike." Olson, supra note 72, at 494 (footnote omitted).
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III
IMPASSE RESOLUTION THROUGH A REFERENDUM
OR A STRIKE
A. Submitting the Impasse to the Electorate.- A Case Study of Local
858, International Association of Firefighters and the City of
Denver, Colorado
In 1971, an amendment to the city charter gave Denver firefighters
the right to bargain collectively. The amended charter provided that
employment bargaining impasses would be resolved through binding
arbitration. This method was successfully used in 1975 to resolve a
wage dispute between the City of Denver and Local 858, International
Association of Firefighters. The arbitration panel in that case awarded
the firefighters a 9.5% pay increase, this validating the Union's belief in
the fairness and efficiency of the arbitration process." 4
The following year, the Colorado Supreme Court declared that a
binding arbitration ordinance in Greeley, Colorado, was unconstitu-
tional.'" 5 Accordingly, Local 858 and the City of Denver discussed
methods of impasse resolution to replace their own invalid contractual
provision. Among the alternatives was a union proposal" 6 to submit
impasses to a referendum of the electorate. The City of Englewood,
Colorado, had approved such a method in 1972,"1 although it never
used the procedure to resolve an impasse.118
The union's proposal was adopted. Following negotiations con-
cerning election timing and procedures, the parties agreed that the ref-
erendum would be through special election. The specifics of the
agreement provided that
[u]pon the request of the employer or the sole and exclusive agent of
the firefighters, after publication of the advisory fact-finder's report,
and after the employer and the sole and exclusive agent of the
114. Interview with Ron Moeder, current President of Local 858, International Ass'n of
Firefighters, and member of the union's negotiating team at pertinent times, in Denver, Colorado
(June 14, 1983) (hereinafter cited as Moeder Interview).
115. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
116. Moeder Interview, supra note 114. The language of the proposal was framed by the
attorneys representing Local 858.
117. The referendum process appears to have originated in Englewood as an amendment to
the city charter. It was proposed by the city and adopted by the voters. City Manager Andy
McCowan stated that the referendum is an effective method of avoiding strikes and is preferable
to arbitration as a means of impasse resolution. McCowan observed, "The most damaging aspects
of binding arbitration I believe are twofold: one, it often makes for unrealistic bargaining on the
part of the unions since they have absolutely nothing to lose; and secondly, decisions often go far
past wages and fringe benefits and get into areas preferably reserved for management." Andy
McCowan, Referendum Impasse Plan Works in Englewood, Colo., 8 LAB. MGMT. REL. SERVICE
NEWSLETrER 2-3 (June 1977).
118. According to McCowan, two impasses have been resolved under the procedure without
resort to an election. Id at 2.
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firefighters have had five (5) days to further negotiate the disputed is-
sues, the final offers of the employer and of the sole and exclusive agent
of the firefighters on the issues remaining unresolved shall each be sub-
mitted as alternative single measures to a vote of the qualified electors
of the City and County of Denver at a special election. The special
election shall be held no later than August 31. The qualified electors
shall select either the final offer of the employer or the final offer of the
sole and exclusive agent of the firefighters, as presented to the advisory
fact-finder. Issues agreed to during the five-day period shall not be in-
cluded in the final offer of the employer or of the sole and exclusive
agent of the firefighters. The cost of such special elections shall be
borne by either the employer or the sole and exclusive agent of the
firefighters, which ever refuses to accept the recommendations of the
advisory fact-finder. If both refuse, the costs shall be borne equally by
the employer and the sole and exclusive agent of the firefighters.
11 9
In March 1981, the parties commenced negotiations for a labor
agreement to become effective January 1, 1982. A number of issues
resulted in impasse, including the length of the firefighters' workweek.
At the time, firefighters were scheduled on a 48-hour week with
"Kelly" days. The city proposed to extend the workweek to 56 hours
under the so-called "Berkeley" system.' 20 The union viewed the city's
position as a retrenchment which was totally unacceptable.1 21
The impasses proceeded to factfinding under the jurisdiction of a
single impartial factfinder who had been selected by agreement. After
five days of hearing, the factfinder issued an award containing recom-
mended resolutions of various issues. Regarding the workweek issue,
he ruled that the city's proposal should be adopted. The asserted justi-
fication for his ruling was that "the hard core matters of management
of the fire suppression forces and the airport subdivision trend heavily
in favor of the Berkley [sic] plan."'' 22
The union's president said he was shocked and outraged at the
hours ruling. 12 3 He reportedly indicated "little willingness to accept
the recommendations,"'' 24 and indicated that it was "highly probable"
that the matter would be submitted to the electorate; the expense of this
to the union was estimated at $175,000.125 In contrast, the city was
"surprised and delighted with the recommendations,"'' 26 and believed
119. DENVER, COLO. CHARTER art. C5.80-8 (1979).
120. For explanations of the "Kelly" and "Berkeley" Systems see infra text accompanying
note 132.
121. Moeder Interview, supra note 114.
122. Fact-Finding Recommendations, Denver Fire Fighters Local 858 and City and County
of Denver 24 (1981) (Sembower, Factfinder).
123. Denver Post, June 24, 1981, at 21, col. 5.
124. Rocky Mountain News, June 24, 1981, at 140, col. 2.
125. Denver Post, June 24, 1981, at 21, col. 5.
126. Id, June 23, 1981, at 13, col. 1.
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that the city would have an advantage if the issue were placed before
the electorate. 2  The city publicly stated its intention to accept every
recommendation of the factfinder.
128
Local 858's membership voted "overwhelmingly" to reject two rec-
ommendations made by the factfinder, including the ruling concerning
hours of work, and to exercise its right to an election. 129 Subsequently
the election was scheduled for August 15, 1981. Framing the language
to appear on the ballot regarding hours of work proved to be difficult.
The union accused the city of misrepresenting facts and of drafting
submissions that were so complicated voters won't understand them.
30
The final form of the official ballot asked voters to select either the
union's or the city's proposals. The work hours proposals appeared on
the ballot as follows, as drafted by the union and the city, respectively:
Firefighters in the fire suppression force shall work a work schedule
consisting of twenty-four (24) hour shifts for an average work week of
forty-eight (48) hours. This will be implemented by the use of a three
(3) platoon system with each firefighter working one (1) twenty-four
(24) hour shift followed by two (2) days off, with a "Kelly" day to be
taken within each twenty-one (21) calendar day cycle. A "Kelly" day
shall not be counted as a working shift for any purpose.
Firefighters in the Suppression Force and Airport Subdivision shall be
on duty based on a scheduling system commonly known as the Berke-
ley System. The Berkeley System consists of a nine (9) day duty cycle
in which the first twenty-four (24) hour day (shift) is on duty, the sec-
ond day is off duty, the third day is on duty, the fourth day is off duty,
the fifth day is on duty and the remaining sixth through ninth days are
off duty. This schedule is implemented by the use of a three (3) platoon
system. Thus, the firefighter is on duty for three (3) days of each nine
(9) day cycle or nine (9) days in each twenty-seven (27) day period. 13'
The substantive issues of the dispute received considerable public-
ity during the campaign period, and public officials expressed their po-
sitions vigorously. The Mayor of Denver, for example, warned that the
union's contract demands would cost the taxpayers $2.5 million annu-
ally, and urged voters to support the city's contract plan. 3 2 One Den-
127. Id While the basis for the city's belief is not elaborated, the context of the article indi-
cates that the city felt the factfinder's award would carry significant weight relative to public
opinion.
128. Id, June 25, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
129. Rocky Mountain News, June 28, 1981, at 15, col. 3.
130. Denver Post, July 21, 1981, at 11, col. 1. Local President Moeder reportedly said, "As a
final insult. . . the city's proposed ballot language was written without consulting the firefighters,
despite the fact we are paying for the Aug. 25 election." Id.
131. OFFICIAL SAMPLE BALLOT (Special Municipal Election, City and County of Denver,
August 25, 1981).
132. Denver Post, August 8, 1981, at 2, col. i.
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ver newspaper supporting the city's position observed that Local 858
"appears to be stretching Denverites a bit too thin"; the editorial con-
cluded, "The outside arbiter's recommendations were sound and
should have been adopted by both sides in the first place."'' 33 And a
group calling itself "Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility" sponsored ad-
vertisements attacking the union, characterizing the union's bargaining
demands as "an unfair and unreasonable burden on the city and Den-
ver taxpayers."' 34
Local 858's campaign consisted primarily of telephone contacts
and door-to-door canvassing. Approximately 350 members actively
participated in the campaign, each devoting approximately three or
four days to campaign work. On election day, some 200 firefighters
participated in a final campaign effort. 135
The electorate voted to approve the final offer of Local 858. The
concluding tally showed 22,519 votes in favor of the union's proposal
and 22,403 in favor of the city's proposal. 36
According to Local 858's president, the cost of the election was
defrayed through a two-year membership assessment of $15 per
month. 137 The assessment replaced $160,000 taken from the Local
treasury to pay for the election. 38  Thus, the total cost of the election
amounted to $360 per union member. In the Local's opinion, however,
the benefit of retaining the shorter workweek clearly outweighed the
effort and expense of the election. 139
Besides fulfilling the Local's substantive goals, the election gave
the union a sense of strength and purpose. The election victory gener-
ated an increase in union participation and improved morale among
union members. I'I Conversely, an election loss would have had a dele-
terious effect on the union and on the union's bargaining power relative
to that of the city. ' 4 ' Thus, the election alternative imposed substantial
costs on and posed significant risks to the union. But, as the Local 858
example shows, the referendum election was a viable option among
impasse resolution techniques.
133. Rocky Mountain News, August 24, 1981, at 63, col. i.
134. Id., August 19, 1981, at 83, col. 3.
135. Moeder Interview, supra note 114.
136. Denver Post, August 26, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
137. Moeder Interview, supra note 114.
138. Prior to the election, the Denver Election Commission had required Local 858 to put up
a $160,000 surety bond or establish a cash escrow account. Denver Post, July 25, 1981, at 3, ol. i.
139. Moeder Interview, supra note 114.
140. Id Moeder pointed out that the Local also had gained and demonstrated substantial
expertise in political campaigning, a fact which appeared to have made some impression on Coun-
cil members.
141. Id
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B. The Referendum Model: A Speciic Proposal
The legislative framework for a proposed dispute resolution pro-
cess (to be referred to as the "Referendum Model") is discussed below.
The proposal incorporates various features of different impasse resolu-
tion processes, including the right to strike. For purposes of conven-
ience, the existence of an administrative body ("Board") is postulated.
Step 1. Notication of Impasse. The parties engaged in public
sector labor agreement negotiations are required to notify the Board of
a bargaining impasse. Notification is in the form of a summary state-
ment of the issues and the respective positions of the parties. If the
parties cannot agree on the contents of the notification, each party may
submit its own statement. Either party may declare an impasse.
42
Step 2. Mediation. Within ten days, the Board will appoint an
official to mediate the dispute at no cost to the parties. Alternatively,
the parties may select and compensate their own mediator, upon the
Board's approval. The parties and the mediator have ten days in which
to resolve the impasse. Following this period, the mediator will issue a
written report to the Board. In its discretion, the Board may make the
mediator's report public. 143
Step 3. Facflnding. If mediation is unsuccessful, the Board will
direct the parties to engage in factftnding. The Board will appoint a
factfinder who shall be compensated by the parties; the Board may, in
its discretion, appoint a factfinder jointly requested by the parties. The
factfinding process will include a hearing with the introduction of evi-
dence, examination of witnesses, and argument. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the factfinder will issue a written report resolving each
area of impasse, supported by a statement of reasoning. The report
shall be made public."' On a designated date no later than ten days
following issuance of the report, the parties shall simultaneously serve
notice on the Board indicating acceptance or rejection of any or all of
the findings.' 45 Following this, the parties shall have an additional five
day period in which to engage in bargaining.
Step 4. Referendum. If the employees' collective bargaining rep-
resentative rejects any or all of the factfinder's recommendations, the
142. By allowing either party to declare an impasse and invoke the next stage of the process,
the Model will enhance genuine bargaining prior to impasse. Once that threshold is passed, only
mutual agreement will prevent one party from progressing to the final stage.
143. If the Board determines that disclosure would lead to a positive result, it may make the
report public. The threat of disclosure might itself encourage meaningful bargaining.
144. At this stage of the procedure, public opinion will prove valuable to the parties in evalu-
ating further strategies.
145. The Model will generate maximum pressure on the parties by forcing both sides to reach
a decision without knowledge of the adversary's decision. Rejection of the award by only one
party automatically results in grave risk or subsequent capitulation for that party.
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representative may submit the impasse to a referendum of the electo-
rate. The choices on the ballot shall be the factfinder's recommenda-
tion on the issue and the proposal which the representative submitted.
The cost of the election shall be borne by the representative, and the
election commission may require adequate funds to be placed in
escrow.
Where both parties reject any or all of the factfinder's recommen-
dations, the ballot choices shall be the positions of the parties prior to
factfinding, as contained in the mediator's report. Alternatively, the
parties may mutually agree to the specific language of the ballot.16 In
the event of a joint referendum, the cost of the election shall be shared
equally between the employees' representative and the employer.
Step 5. Strike. If the employer rejects any of the factfinder's rec-
ommendations, the labor organization shall be permitted to undertake
a strike, provided it furnishes notice of its intent to do so at least ten
days prior to the commencement of the action. Once the strike is in
progress, the employer may petition the Board for an order declaring
the strike to be an immediate and significant hazard to the public wel-
fare, and enjoining the employees from further strike activity. If the
employer obtains such an order, the factfinder's disposition of the im-
passe shall be implemented as the terms of the labor agreement. 147
C A Critical Evaluation of the Referendum Model
On preliminary appraisal, certain objections might be directed to-
ward the Referendum Model. First, it might be contended that the cost
of an election renders the Model impractical in many instances, partic-
ularly in a large city such as New York or Los Angeles or where the
bargaining unit is statewide. 4 Second, the Model might allow public
officials to manipulate the referendum process for purposes of political
aggrandizement, rather than employ it for a legitimate collective-bar-
gaining objective. Third, the Model ostensibly may not be conducive
to the formulation of sound public policy, inasmuch as the electorate is
146. By requiring a ballot submission consisting of respective positions as of impasse, the
parties will be encouraged to moderate their demands so as to gain some strategic advantage in
the event of a joint referendum. Likewise, a mutual formulation of the ballot language might
conceivably lead to resolution of the dispute.
147. If the employer could successfully halt a work stoppage with no effective sanctions for
doing so, the strike weapon would be significantly vitiated. Consequently, the Model provides a
substantial disincentive for the employer to seek an injunction.
148. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-6 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Supp. 1982), which states, "All
employees throughout the State within any of the following categories shall constitute an appro-
priate bargaining unit," and then continues to list thirteen occupational groups. Likewise, there
may be unique circumstances obtaining in the federal sector. Where the bargaining unit is nation-
wide, however, the Model could apply to it as feasibly as to a state-wide model. See infra note
150. Moreover, in a situation such as the Air Traffic Controller's dispute, the Model arguably
would have provided a result superior to that reached in the actual case.
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not capable of understanding and choosing among complex issues of
contract negotiations. Each of these points is considered below.
1. Election Costs and Union Incentives to Bargain
The Referendum Model forces a union which rejects a factfinder's
award to make a substantial investment in the resolution process. For
example, the cost of the Local 858 election was $160,000; the direct cost
to each member was $360. In addition to monetary costs, the average
union member donated approximately three to four days to campaign
activity. 149 These costs are not insumountable in a large state. A union
could conceivably afford an election in California.'5 °
Moreover, while the cost of an election can be predicted, the out-
come of the election can not. The, instrumentality of the Model is
highly attenuated. In the case of Local 858, for example, 117 votes out
of 44,922 total votes cast would have reversed the election outcome. '
5
'
Further, the consequences of losing an election entail the risk of severe
loss of morale and commitment within the bargaining unit. In view of
the calculable immediate costs and the incalculable but important long-
term ones, a small local union in a large city might, as a practical mat-
ter, be precluded from seeking an election. However, this is more prop-
erly regarded as a strength of the Model than a weakness.
Under the private sector strike model, union power is a function of
such variables as the union's willingness to strike, the degree of unioni-
zation within the industry, the percentage of union members within the
enterprise, and the size of the particular operation. 52 A union which
lacks a sufficient measure of power will be deterred from undertaking a
strike.
One of the salient deficiencies of the public sector arbitration pro-
cess as a means of impasse resolution is that it imposes no meaningful
costs on the participants, and thereby treats dissimilar unions alike.
The only expense involved in arbitration is payment of the arbitrator's
fee and any incidental costs of the hearing. Legal representation may
be an additional cost, but it is not a requisite of arbitration. The most
149. Moeder Interview, supra note 114.
150. The administrative cost of a statewide referendum in California is $15,000,000. Legisla-
ture v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal.3d 658, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 659 P.2d 17 (1983). There are 31,989
employees in California's largest bargaining unit. 3 CAL. PuB. EMP. REL. SPECIAL REPORTING
SERIES No. 17 (July 10, 1981). Each employee would thus have to pay $467. Alternatively, if the
union, California State Employees Association (CSEA), created an "election fund" similar to a
"strike fund" in the private sector, and the entire union membership contributed, the cost would
be only about $163 for each of the union's 91,792 members. This membership figure was obtained
in a telephone interview with Larry Bauman, Communications Specialist, California State Em-
ployees Association, Sacramento, California.
151. See supra text accompanying note 138.
152. T. KOCHAN, supra note 14, at 317-24.
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serious risk incurred by either party is that its position will be rejected.
Thus, it can be said with some justification that a union loses nothing
when it opts for arbitration, and that a small, weak local stands to gain
to the same extent as a large, strong one.'5 3
The Referendum Model corrects the distortion of power inherent
in the arbitration method. The union's ability to fund an election and
the willingness of its members to do so are fairly comparable to the
indicia of union strength that are significant in private-sector strike de-
cisions.154  The public sector union is faced with a direct economic
hardship in the expense of holding an election, and that hardship will
be exacerbated if the election ends in defeat. Labor organizations in
the private sector necessarily engage in a similar analysis of the costs
and benefits of the strike weapon. Therefore, the public sector union
operating under the Referendum Model will have the same incentives
to engage in genuine bargaining as does its private sector counterpart
under the pure strike model.' 5 5 Thus, the Referendum Model will re-
flect the economic strength of a local union in an accurate fashion.
That effect in and of itself renders the Model superior to other impasse-
resolution methods now in existence.
2. The Public Official's Perspective
It can also be argued that the Referendum Model will lead to the
abusive exercise of power by public officials. For example, an office-
holder might refuse to bargain meaningfully with a weak local and thus
provoke it into impasse and mediation. The official could then reject
the mediator's award, regardless of whether or not it was equitable, and
force the union either to strike or to yield to the employer's demands.
In either event, the official's political fortunes would be enhanced
through a putative solicitude for the public fisc.
One response is that a private sector union, if it is the significantly
weaker party, is routinely subjected to such indignities by the em-
ployer. It is well established that under the NLRA an employer's duty
153. Clark, supra note 74, at 508, observes of the arbitration process that "its very availability
tends to result in its over-usage." He continues that arbitration awards necessarily have a broader
impact than their effect on the immediate parties.
154. For a general discussion of strike costs to a union, see D. DILTS & C. DEITSCH, LABOR
RELATIONS 140-142 (1983).
155. Wellington and Winter argue than an important difference between private and public-
sector strikes is duration. Because the latter interrupt services to the community, they will be
settled more quickly than the former. Thus, public sector strikes are not restrained by the "unem-
ployment trade-off." See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., supra note 65, at 25-26. The cost of
an election to each member of a labor organization under the Referendum Model will vary ac-
cording to the total membership. In some cases, the election option will fairly approximate the
economic losses incurred in a protracted work stoppage.
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to bargain does not require the making of concessions.1 16 Provided the
employer bargains in good faith, 57 its legal obligation is satisfied, and
a weak union must either accept the employer's offer or suffer the con-
sequences of an unavailing strike. Public-sector unions logically
should have no greater protection or advantages.
Furthermore, the Referendum Model militates against arbitrary
employer conduct by means of political accountability. The union will
presumably have an opportunity to present its version of the dispute to
the media. If it persuasively demonstrates that the responsible public
official is acting in a capricious, demeaning and patently unjust manner
toward public workers, the official can be punished through the
Model's election process or through general elections. Conversely, if it
appears that the official has in fact acted in the best interests of the
public, the official can be rewarded through public approbation. The
Referendum Model assures a maximum of political accountability and
thus avoids a severe policy shortcoming of the arbitration method.
3. Public Policy and the Electorate
Collective negotiations frequently involve issues of a sophisticated
and complex nature, as the Denver Firefighters work hours issue dem-
onstrates. In public presentation, a difficult issue can be distorted to
the advantage of a particular party or reduced to a simplistic and inac-
curate level.15 8 Arguably, therefore, the public's choice might not be
effective in terms of important policy objectives.
However, the Referendum Model does not significantly detract
from the authority or responsibility of the bargaining parties to engage
in meaningful decision-making. The structure of the Model assures
that policy options will in the first instance be selected by the appropri-
ate official. Only when there is a dispute of sufficient magnitude as to
lead to impasse will the public take part in the process. Accordingly,
the election device serves primarily as a final check on decision-mak-
ing, and. not as a substitute for the myriad of functions performed by
officials in shaping and directing policy during the formative stages.
Second, on a more theoretical level, one essential premise of our
political process is that "an active and legitimate group in the popula-
156. Section 8(d) of the NLRA specifically provides that the obligation to bargain collectively
"does not compel either a party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 553-58 (C.
Morris, ed. 1983).
157. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 156, at 570-606.
158. For example, the newspaper advertisement of the "Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility"
(CFR) characterized the dispute strictly in terms of economics. With no explanation of its data,
the CFR concluded that the cost of the Union's plan to the taxpayer would amount to $2.5 million
per year. It urged the citizen "to vote to save $2.5 million annually." There was no discussion of
the unique working conditions in firefighting. Rocky Mountain News, supra note 136, page 1.
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tion can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the pro-
cess of decision."' 59 Conceding Wellington and Winters' point that an
organization of public workers ought not to wield a "disproportionate"
amount of power by means of strikes, 60 there is nevertheless a political
value in permitting workers to assert their claims in the democratic pro-
cess. 16' That process' in fact, remains viable only through the reconcili-
ation of conflicting interests.'
6 2
The Referendum Model adjusts the unsatisfactory allocations of
political power that inhere in the arbitration model and the pure strike
model. Impasse resolution through arbitration shields the public offi-
cial from the power of the electorate. Similarly, a union potentially
exercises an inordinate degree of political power where it is permitted
to strike without substantial checks. Under the Referendum Model,
the possibility of a strike can be controlled in significant measure by the
public employer. Thus, when a strike would be unduly harmful, the
public official can choose to accept the factfinder's award as the least
destructive alternative, thereby preventing a powerful union from pur-
suing and attaining extreme demands by striking the relatively vulnera-
ble employer.'
6 3
Finally, the Referendum Model will reinvigorate the democratic
system on the state and local level. Although an election campaign
under the Model will necessarily focus only on a limited number of
issues, the broader implications of public employment will probably be
addressed in public debate. Citizens will be motivated to participate by
reason of political and economic self-interest. The Referendum Model
will serve to educate the electorate concerning public employment and
will structure the relationship between the citizen and the public ser-
vant on a more intimate basis, a consequence that will inure to the
larger public good. 164
159. R. DAHL. A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956).
160. The political theory relied upon by Wellington and Winter is that expressed by Dahl, id,
transposed to the collective bargaining context. Their assertion that public sector strikes provide
unions with a "disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision" is an inference
drawn from Dahl's framework. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., supra note 65, at 24-29.
161. Dahl observes, "The fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of American plural-
ism is, I believe, this: Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers
of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign." R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 24 (1967).
162. [d Dahl contends that "constant negotiations among different centers of power are nec-
essary refine and perfect methods of conflict resolution."
163. Arguably, the employer may be afforded some tactical advantage by retaining control
over the strike weapon. See Gallagher, The Use of Interest4rbitration in the Public Sector, INDUS.
REL. RESEARCH AssoC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1982 SPRING MEETING, supra note 72, at 501, 506-
507. However, under the Referendum Model, the union is afforded the choice of an election,
thereby minimizing any power accruing to the employer by virtue of its strike/no-strike option.
164. See Macy, The Role ofBargaining in the Public Service, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUB-
LIC UNIONS 5, supra note 109.
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IV
CONCLUSION
The Referendum Model avoids the major obstacles confronting
other impasse resolution procedures currently in effect. It has, further,
two positive attributes of importance to public-sector bargaining. First,
it insures that negotiations will be conducted in a pragmatic, realistic
environment where the parties have a genuine incentive to reach agree-
ment and where the risks of failing to do so are too substantial to be
disregarded. Second, the procedure motivates citizens to take an active
interest in matters of public employment, including a broad range of
issues beyond the merely economic. It thus will enhance productivity
and the quality of work in the public sector. Ultimately, of course, the
efficacy of the Referendum Model can be established only through
practical experimentation. But experience has already proved the
weaknesses of present methods, and legislative innovation is necessary
to develop more viable strategies.
